The structure of a biological population affects the outcome of evolutionary processes [1, 2, 3, 4]. Understanding evolution in structured populations is difficult. Precise results have been absent for a long time, but have recently emerged for the special case where each individual has the same number of neighbors [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. But the general problem of determining natural selection, when the number of neighbors varies, has remained open. For arbitrary selection intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class which suggests there is no efficient algorithm [13] . But whether there exists a simple solution for weak selection was unanswered. Here we provide, surprisingly, a general formula for weak selection that holds for any graph. Thus, we can predict evolutionary dynamics on any static population structure. Our method uses coalescent theory [14, 15] and relies on calculating the meeting times of random walks [16, 17] . We use our result to design social networks that maximally favor evolution 1 arXiv:1605.06530v1 [q-bio.PE] 
of cooperation. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based on strong pairwise ties.
Studying the effects of population structure has a long tradition in ecology [18, 19, 20, 21] and evolution [1, 2, 22] . Evolutionary graph theory is a general approach to studying dynamics in structured populations [3, 5, 7, 11] . The individuals of the population occupy the vertices of the graph, and the edges determine who interacts with whom ( Fig. 1 ). Graphs can represent the spatial structure of populations of bacteria, plants or animals [23] , or the tissue architecture and differentiation hierarchy in multi-cellular organism [24] or social networks in the context of genetic or cultural evolution [25, 26] . Graph topology has been shown to affect the rate of neutral evolution [27] , the balance of drift versus selection [3] , and the emergence of social behavior [28, 5, 6, 7, 25, 12] . The well-mixed population, which is the classical scenario for many mathematical studies of evolution [29, 30, 31] , is given by the complete graph with identical weights.
Evolutionary games are especially sensitive to population structure. Evolutionary game theory was conceived by John Maynard Smith [32] to study aspects of animal behavior. It quickly came to represent the population-based approach for any strategic interaction, including among humans. Evolutionary game dynamics, which is strongly tied to ecological dynamics [33] , arises whenever the success of a type is frequency dependent [34, 35, 36] .
In the present paper we study games on graphs [28, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 37] . The individuals of a population occupy the vertices of a graph. Each time-step, each individual interacts with its neighbors according to a game. The reproductive rate of each individual i is then set to F i = 1 + δf i , where f i is the average payoff that i receives from its neighbors, and δ 1 is a parameter representing the strength of selection. Evolution proceeds according to Death-Birth (DB) updating [5]: A random individual dies and a neighbor is chosen, with probability proportional to reproductive rate, to reproduce into the vacancy. Death-Birth is a natural scenario for genetic evolution and also translates into social settings: a random individual resolves to update its strategy; subsequently it adopts one of its neighbors' strategies proportional to their payoff. We assume that offspring inherit the strategy of their parents without mutation.
We consider weighted, undirected graphs. Each link has an arbitrary, non-negative weight, which determines the strength of the interaction for Figure 1 : Evolutionary games on weighted heterogeneous graphs. a, Each individual interacts with each neighbor and retains the average payoff from these interactions, weighted by edge weight. Here payoffs are shown for an arbitrary 2 × 2 game with payoff matrix [(a, b), (c, d)]. b, Under Death-Birth updating, a random individual is selected for death (red X) and replaced by a neighbor (black circles) proportionally to rescaled payoff. Thus an individual (distance 0 to itself) interacts with its neighbors (distance 1) and competes for reproduction with its neighbors-of-neighbors (distance 2), who in turn interact with their own neighbors (distance 3). These considerations provide the intuition for Condition (1) of the main text. c, In Eq. (3) for the critical b/c ratio, p i is the probability that a randomly chosen neighbor of i will chose i in return, with both choices made proportionally to edge weight.
generating payoff and the probability of strategy transmission during reproduction. Our results hold for arbitrary connected graphs of finite size N . This parameter specifies the total population size.
Let us begin by considering two types of strategies representing cooperators, C, and defectors D. Cooperators pay a cost, c, and distribute a benefit, b. Defectors pay no cost and provide no benefit. If we introduce a single cooperator in a population of defectors, then the probability that the cooperator generates a lineage which will take over the entire population is given by the fixation probability, ρ C . Likewise, if we introduce a single defector in a population of cooperators, then the probability that the defector generates a lineage which will take over the population is given by the fixation probability, ρ D . If ρ C > ρ D then natural selection favors the fixation of cooperators over the fixation of defectors [31, 38] .
Starting from the initial condition of one invader placed in a random position, the stochastic process eventually reaches one of the two absorbing states corresponding to extinction or fixation of the invader. Denote by T the expected time until absorption. Denote by t n the expected time that two vertices separated by a random walk of n steps are occupied by individuals employing different strategies (see Appendix D for a precise definition). Thus, T − t n represents the expected time that two vertices separated by a random walk of length n are occupied by the same strategy.
We prove (Appendices A-E) that the condition for cooperators to be favored over defectors, ρ C > ρ D , can be written in the form
Intuitively, the inequality describes the condition for a cooperator to have a higher average payoff than a random individual two steps away. If an individual dies, then a cooperator competes for that site with other individuals that are two steps away (Fig 1b) . The first term, −c(T − t 0 ), is the cost for being a cooperator which is paid by the cooperator for the entire time, T , because the time that an individual uses a different strategy than its own is zero, t 0 = 0. The second term, b(T − t 1 ), denotes the average benefit that the cooperator gets from its one step neighbors. For an average time of T − t 1 a one step neighbor is also a cooperator. The average payoff on an individual two steps away is given by −c(T −t 2 )+b(T −t 3 ). That individual pays a cost whenever it is a cooperator, which happens on average for T − t 2 time units. That individual receives a benefit whenever its one step neighbors (which are three step neighbors of the first cooperator) are cooperators, which happens on average for T − t 3 time units. Thus the overall condition (1) can be intuitively understood in terms of strategic and competitive interactions at various distances [39, 8] . Interestingly, we do not know how to calculate the basic time T , but it cancels out. We obtain −ct 2 +b(t 3 −t 1 ) > 0. Two conclusions are immediate. If t 3 ≤ t 1 , cooperation is not favored for any positive values of b and c. But if t 3 > t 1 , cooperation is favored if the benefit to cost ratio exceeds a critical threshold given by
(2) Equation (2) provides the exact threshold for cooperation to succeed under weak selection. The times t n can be obtained using coalescent theory, which traces lineages backwards in time to a common ancestor [14, 15] . Ancestral lineages are represented as a pair of random walks that step independently until they meet [16, 40, 17] . We prove in Appendix D.4 that t n is equal to the expected meeting time of two random walks whose initial positions are separated by a random walk of length n. These meeting times can be computed by solving a system of linear equations (see Appendix D.3), giving an efficient method to calculate (b/c) * on any graph. The exactness of this method is confirmed by Monte Carlo simulations ( Fig. K1 ).
Which networks best facilitate the evolution of cooperation? We find that cooperation thrives when each individual is insignificant within the global population, but significant within its local neighborhood. To quantify this property, we first, define the weighted degree w i as the sum of all weights of links connected to vertex i. The fraction π i = w i / i w i gives the significance of i within the global population. We quantify significance within one's local neighborhood by the probability p i that a random walk from i returns to i on its second step ( Fig. 1c ). In other words, p i is the probability that, if i choses a neighbor (for an interaction), that choice is returned by the neighbor. A large network is a strong promoter of cooperation if the global quantities π i are vanishingly small but the local quantities p i are not (Box 1). This property can be satisfied even on strongly heterogeneous "scale-free" networks, but not on the star (Fig. 2b) , for which the hub comprises half of the total degree. For a large network satisfying this property, the critical w 1n e f w 1 Figure 2 : Graphs that promote or hinder cooperation. a, We prove that, for any graph in which each vertex has one partner with edge weight w and all other edges have weight 1, the critical benefit-cost ratio (b/c) * converges to 1 as w → ∞. Thus any cooperative act providing a net benefit can be favored for sufficiently large w on these networks. b, The weighted star graph does not support cooperation. In this graph, edges of arbitrary weight link a hub vertex to each of n leaves, and no edges exist between leaves. c, The complete bipartite graph K also does not support cooperation. In this graph, vertices are partitioned into two sets. Edges of weight 1 join each pair of vertices from different sets, and no edges exist between pairs from the same set. For both the weighted star and the complete bipartite graph, all walks of odd length are equivalent; thus t 3 = t 1 and cooperation cannot be favored according to (2). Panels d-f show specific examples of the result discussed in panel a: in each case, (b/c) * converges to 1 as the edge weight w between partners goes to infinity. d, A regular graph in which each individual has one neighbor of weight w and k of weight 1. For N k, the critical benefit-cost ratio is (b/c) * = (w + k) 2 /(w 2 + k). e, A line of length 4 with edge weights w, 1, w. The critical benefit-cost ratio is (b/c) * = w 2 /(w + 1) 2 . f, A complete graph in which each vertex has one partner with edge weight w and all other edge weights are 1. The critical benefit-cost ratio is (b/c) * = (w − 2 + N ) 2 /[(w − 2) 2 − N ]. Cooperation is only possible when w > √ N + 2 (dashed lines on plot).
benefit-cost ratio is approximately given by
Here,p is a weighted average of the p i . (The weighting is specified in Appendix E.2, which also gives an exact version of Condition (3) for finite populations.) Cooperation therefore succeeds best when the p i are large-that is, when the choice of a neighbor is likely to be reciprocated. Ideal promoters of cooperation contain strong reciprocal pairs ( Fig. 2a ,d-f).
Our results also tell us which graphs do not support cooperation. For example, on the weighted star graph ( Fig. 2b ), random walks alternate at each step between the hub and a random leaf, chosen with probability proportional to edge weight. Any walk of odd length is equivalent to any other; in particular, t 3 = t 1 . Cooperation is therefore impossible according to Eq. (2). A similar argument applies to the (unweighted) complete bipartite graph ( Fig. 2c ): random walks alternate between the two vertex sets, each time choosing a vertex uniformly at random. Again, all walks of odd length are equivalent, so that t 3 = t 1 and cooperation is never favored.
In some cases, a small change in graph topology can dramatically alter the fate of cooperation ( Fig. 3 ). For example, if we alter the star (which does not support cooperation) by linking pairs of leaves to obtain a "ceiling fan" (Fig. 3b ), cooperation becomes possible as long as b/c > 8. Alternatively, if we join two stars by linking their hubs [25] (Fig. 3e ), cooperation succeeds whenever b/c > 5/2. These examples raise the possibility that modest, targeted interventions in network structure ("graph surgery") can facilitate a transition to a more cooperative society.
An important special case is a weighted regular graph, in which each individual has the same distribution of edge weights to its neighbors. Here co-
is the Simpson degree of the graph [23, 11] . This formula was previously known for weighted vertex-transitive graphs [6, 11] and for unweighted regular graphs [10]. In the latter case the Simpson degree κ equals the number of neighbors k per vertex, and in the limit of large population size we recover the well-known condition b/c > k [5]. Eq.
(2) enables rapid computation of the critical benefit-cost ratio on any given graph. We use this result to numerically investigate the evolution of cooperation on random unweighted graphs ( Fig. 4 ). For Erdös-Renyi graphs ( Fig. 3ace ), (b/c) * appears to converge to the mean degreek for large N . This Figure 3 : Rescuing the evolution of cooperation via surgery on graphs. a, The star graph with n leaves does not support cooperation (i.e. the critical b/c ratio is infinite). b, By joining each leaf to one other, one obtains a "ceiling fan" graph with (b/c) * = 4(6n − 7)/(3n − 16), which approaches 8 as n → ∞. c-e, By joining two stars, one obtains critical b/c ratios of 3, 14/5, and 5/2, respectively, depending on whether the joining edge is between two leaves, a leaf of one and the hub of the other, or both hubs. These values are in the limit of large n; exact results for finite n are given in the SI.
suggests a universality principle similar to one recently proven for constant selection [41] . For degree-uncorrelated scale-free graphs ( Fig. 3bdf ), (b/c) * is slightly larger than k by a ratio that increases with the heterogeneity (i.e. decreases with the tail exponent γ). Still, the condition b/c >k serves remarkably well as a rule of thumb-a noteworthy result, given that for scale-free graphs there is no "typical" number of neighbors per individual.
So far we have discussed the evolutionary dynamics of cooperators and defectors, but our theory extends to any two-strategy game
We prove (Appendix G.1) that on any graph, the condition for natural selection to favor A over B, in the sense that ρ A > ρ B for weak selection, can be written [43] as σa
We also prove (Appendix G.2) that both numerator and denominator are strictly positive for any connected graph of size N > 2.
We have also assumed so far that reproductive rates depend on the average payoff obtained from neighbors. Alternatively, one can use the total payoff [37] , so that individuals with greater weighted degree are more affected by game interaction. We obtain the exact benefit-cost threshold for this case as well (Appendix I).
In summary, we report here the first analytic result describing how natural selection chooses between competing strategies on any graph-that is, on any static population structure-under weak selection. Our framework applies to strategic interactions among humans in social networks as well as ecological and evolutionary interactions among simpler organisms in any kind of spatially structured population. Our result, which applies to arbitrary 2×2 games, also informs which population structures promote certain behaviors, such as cooperation. We find that cooperation is maximally favored in the presence of strong pairwise ties, which is an intriguing mathematical argument for the importance of stable partnerships in forming the backbone of cooperative societies. We computed the critical b/c ratio for randomly generated graphs according to two random graph models. a, In the Erdös-Renyi model, an edge is created between each pair of vertices with probability p, independently of all other edges. The expected mean degree is N p. b, Scale-free graphs with tail exponent 2 < γ ≤ 3 were generated according to the uncorrelated configuration model [42] . c, d, Scatter plots of the critical b/c ratio versus mean degreek for population size N = 800 for Erdös-Renyi graphs and N = 500 for scale-free graphs. Dashed lines represent (b/c) * =k. e, f, Convergence of the ratio of (b/c) * /k as N increases. Cyan dots show (b/c) * /k for individual graphs, circles show the mean, and bars show the standard deviation.
[2] Motoo Kimura and George H Weiss. The stepping stone model of population structure and the decrease of genetic correlation with distance. Genetics, 49(4):561, 1964.
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A Model and notation A.1 Graph
We consider a weighted graph G with edge weights w ij , i, j ∈ G. The graph G is connected, undirected (w ji = w ij for each i, j ∈ G), and has no selfloops (w ii = 0 for each i ∈ G). We define the weighted degree of vertex i as w i = j∈G w ij . The total sum of all edge weights (counting both directions for each pair of vertices) is denoted W :
A.2 Random walks
We will make use of random walks on G in both discrete and continuous time. For a random walk on G, steps are taken with probability proportional to edge weight; thus the probability of a step from i to j is p ij = w ij /w i . The probability that an n-step walk from vertex i terminates at vertex j is denoted p
ij . There is a unique stationary distribution {π i } i∈G for random walks on G, in which vertex i has stationary probability π i = w i /W . Random walks have the reversibility property that for each i, j ∈ G, π i p
ji . We will use the following shorthand: for any function g i on G, we define
is the expected value of g ij where j is the terminus of an n-step random walk from i. For any function h ij on G × G, we define
In words, h (n) is the expected value of h ij where i and j are the two ends of an n-step random walk on G started from stationarity.
A.3 Evolutionary Markov chain
For most of this Supplement we consider a continuous-time version of the death-birth processes. The translation from discrete to continuous time does not affect fixation probabilities or other metrics for evolutionary success.
The state of the evolutionary process is represented as s = (s i ) i∈G ∈ {0, 1} G , where 0 and 1 correspond to the two types and s i ∈ {0, 1} denotes the type of vertex i. In the case of the Prisoners' Dilemma game, we let 1 represent C and 0 represent D.
Evolution is modeled as a continuous-time Markov chain (S(t)) t≥0 on {0, 1} G , which we call the evolutionary Markov chain. The dynamics of the evolutionary Markov chain are described in the following subsections.
A.4 Payoff and reproductive rate
The payoff to vertex i in state s is denoted f i (s). For the general game a 11 a 10 a 01 a 00 ,
we have
For the additive Prisoners' Dilemma game
we have the simpler expression
A.5 Transitions
State transitions in the evolutionary Markov chain occur via replacement events, in which the occupant of one vertex is replaced by the offspring of another. We denote by i → j the event that the occupant of j ∈ G is replaced by the offspring of i ∈ G. Replacement events occur as Poisson processes, with rates depending on the state s. For Death-Birth (DB) updating, these rates are given by
Note that overall, each position is replaced at rate 1 for DB updating. If the replacement event i → j occurs in state s, and s j = s i , then a state transition occurs and the new state s is defined by s j = s i and s k = s k for all k = j. (That is, vertex j inherits the type of vertex i, and all other vertices retain their type.) If s j = s i , then no transition occurs and the state remains s.
B Fixation probability under weak selection
The evolutionary Markov chain has two absorbing states, the state 0 in which s i = 0, ∀i ∈ G and the state 1 for which s i = 1 ∀i ∈ G. These states correspond to the fixation of types 0 and 1, respectively. All other states of the evolutionary Markov chain are transient [38, Theorem 2] . Thus from any given initial state, the evolutionary Markov chain will eventually become absorbed in one of these two fixation states. We denote by ρ s 0 the fixation probability of type 1 from state s 0 ∈ {0, 1} G -that is, the probability that, from initial state s 0 , the evolutionary Markov chain becomes absorbed in state 1.
We are interested in the behavior of these fixation probabilities under weak selection-that is, to first order in δ as δ → 0 + . Chen [10] derived a weak-selection perturbation formula for ρ s 0 , which applies to the birthdeath and death-birth processes considered here. To provide intuition for this formula, we give a heuristic derivation here, referring to [10] for mathematical details.
Our analysis focuses on the degree-weighted frequency of type 1:
The degree weighted frequency at time t is represented by the random vari-
The main idea is thatŜ(t) is a Martingale for the neutral process (δ = 0); and that weak selection can be understood as a perturbation of this Martingale. The weighting π i of vertex i can be understood as its reproductive value [44, 45] . Similar arguments have been used in other contexts [46, 47] . Consider the evolutionary Markov chain with arbitrary initial state S(0) = s 0 ∈ {0, 1} G . By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, the expected degreeweighted frequency E s 0 [Ŝ(T )] at time T > 0 satisfies
In the limit T → ∞, the expected degree-weighted frequency of type 1 be-comes equal to its fixation probability; therefore we have
We now define a state function D(s) giving the expected instantaneous rate of change in the degree-weighted frequency of type 1 from state s. D(s) is defined by the relation
The exact form of D(s) for DB updating is derived in Section C. Substituting in Eq. (11), we obtain
We now consider the case δ = 0, which represents neutral drift (no selection). We indicate quantities under this neutral process by the superscript • . We will show in Section C that, under DB updating, D • (s) = 0 for all s ∈ {0, 1} G , meaning thatŜ(t) is a Martingale for neutral evolution. It follows from Eq. (13) that ρ • s 0 =ŝ 0 ; that is, the fixation probability of type 1, under the neutral process, is equal to its initial degree-weighted frequency (i.e., its initial reproductive value [44, 45] ).
We now turn to weak selection; that is, we consider asymptotic expansions as δ → 0 + . Since D • (s) = 0, we have
This allows us to expand the integrand in Eq. (11):
If we could freely interchange the expansion (15) with the integral in Eq. (11), we would have
A formal justification for this interchange and proof of Eq. (16), for a class of models that includes the death-birth process considered here, is given in Theorem 3.8 of Chen [10] . For convenience, we introduce the following notation: for any function of the state g(s) and any initial state s 0 , we define
Thus Eq. (16) can be rewritten as
Of particular biological importance is case that type 1 initially occupies only a single vertex. In biological terms, a single indivdual of a new type has appeared in the population, e.g. by mutation or migration. We therefore focus in particular on initial states s 0 with exactly one vertex of type 1. Let uu be the probability distribution over states that assigns probability 1/N to all states s with exactly one vertex of type 1, and probability zero to all other states. (That is, we suppose that the new type is equally likely to arise at each vertex. This is a natural assumption for DB updating, but not necessarily for other update rules [38, 48, 27] .) We use the subscript u to denote the expected value of a quantity when the initial state of the evolutionary Markov chain is sampled from u.
We define the overall fixation probability of cooperators as ρ C = ρ u , the probability that cooperation becomes fixed when starting from a single vertex chosen with uniform probability. Taking the expectation of Eq. (18) with s 0 sampled from u, we have
C Weak selection in the short term
Here we compute the expected instantaneous rate of degree-weighted frequency change D(s), under weak selection for a given state s. Note that if the event i → j occurs (that is, if j is replaced by the offspring of i), the resulting change inŝ is π j (s i − s j ). Thus the expected instantaneous rate of degree-weighted frequency change is given by
This shows that D • (s) = 0 for all states s (thusŜ(t) is a Martingale as claimed earlier), and
Applying the operator • u to both sides and comparing with Eq. (19), we obtain that cooperation is favored in the sense that ρ C > 1/N to first order in δ if and only if
The convergence of the operator • u for the quantities in the above condition will be established in Section D.1. We will show in Appendix F that the conditions ρ C > 1/N , ρ D < 1/N and ρ C > ρ D are equivalent for the game (7).
D Coalescing random walks
A coalescing random walk (CRW) [16, 17] is a process consisting of random walks on G that step independently until two walks meet (or "coalescence"), after which these two step together. This process models the tracing of ancestors backwards in time. We will consider both continuous-time and discrete-time versions of the coalescing random walk, starting in either case with two walkers.
In the continuous-time version, we consider a pair of walkers (X(t), Y (t)) with arbitrary initial vertices X(0) = i and Y (0) = j. Both step at rate 1, corresponding to the rate at which sites are replaced in the continuous-time Death-Birth process. X(t) and Y (t) step independently until their time of coalescence (first meeting), which is denoted T coal . After this time, X(t) and Y (t) step together, so that X(t) = Y (t) for all t > T coal . Probabilities and expectations under the continuous-time coalescing random walk from i and j are denoted P CRW (i,j) [ ] and E CRW (i,j) [ ] respectively. In the discrete-time version, at each time step t = 0, 1, . . ., if X(t) = Y (t), one of the two walkers is chosen, with equal probability, to take a random walk step. If X(t) = Y (t), then both make the same random walk step. Again we initialize at an arbitrary pair of vertices X(0) = i and Y (0) = j. We use tildes to indicate the discrete-time process, so that probabilities and expectations under the discrete-time coalescing random walk from i and j are denotedP
We denote the expected coalescence time from i and j in the discretetime coalescing random walk by τ ij =Ẽ CRW (i,j) [T coal ]. Because coalescence times can be understood as hitting times to the diagonal of G × G, and because expected hitting times are preserved under transitions between discrete and continuous time [49, §2.5.3], we have τ ij = 2 E CRW (i,j) [T coal ]. The factor of two arises because, in the continuous-time version, two steps occur per unit time on average. Now suppose that i and j are the two ends of a random walk of length n started at stationarity. Taking the expectation of τ ij over all such choices, we obtain the quantity τ (n) , which is denoted denoted t n in the main text:
D.1 Duality principle
Coalescing random walks are mathematically dual to the neutral DB process [17, Chapter 5] . The biological interpretation of this duality is that a coalescing random walk represents the ancestry of a set of individuals traced backwards in time [14, 16, 15] . A consequence of this duality is that, for any initial state s 0 and any pair of types x, y ∈ {0, 1},
In biological language, this relation says that the occupants of vertices i and j at time t have the same types as their corresponding ancestors at time 0.
D.2 Calculating assortment
Now suppose that the initial state s 0 has a single vertex k of type 1 and all others of type 0: (s 0 ) k = 1 and (s 0 ) = 0 for all = k. Consider the random variable S i (t) S j (t), which equals one if vertices i and j both have type 1 at time t and zero otherwise. Applying the duality relation (23), we find
That is, vertices i and j both have type 1 at time t if and only if they are both descended from the original vertex k of type 1; in particular, this requires that the lineages of these vertices have coalesced before time t in the past. We now consider the initial state sampled from probability distribution u (defined in Section B), which corresponds to setting a randomly chosen vertex to type 1 (with uniform probability) and all others vertices to type 0. Applying Eq. (24), we have
The second equality follows from the law of total probability, since we have summed over all possible values of X(t).
Turning now to the operator • u , we calculate
In particular, this entails that for n 1 , n 2 ≥ 0 i∈G π i s i s
D.3 Recurrence relations for meeting times
The meeting times τ ij satisfy the recurrence relation
Eq. (28) is a system of N 2 linear equations. Numerically solving this system (e.g. by Gaussian elimination) gives an efficient method to determine the critical benefit-cost ratio on according to Eq. (2) any graph.
We will also make use of the concept of remeeting times. To define these we introduce a process called the remeeting random walk (RRW), which consists of two random walks (X(t), Y (t)) both starting at the same vertex i ∈ G: X(0) = Y (0) = i. These random walks step independently until their time T remeet of first remeeting, after which they step together. As in the CRW, we can consider this process in either continuous time (with each walk proceeding at rate 1) or discrete time (with one of the two walkers stepping at each timestep). We let τ + ii =Ẽ RRW i [T remeet ] denote the expected remeeting time in the discrete-time RRW. (τ + ii is shortened to τ i in the main text.) A simple recurrence argument shows that
To derive a recurrence relation for the τ (n) , we expand according to Eq. (28):
We therefore have the recurrence relation
In particular, we have
If we let n → ∞ in Eq. (30) (using Cesàro means to get convergence in the case that random walks on G are periodic) we obtain i∈G π 2 i τ + ii = 1.
Eq. (35) can also be obtained by applying Kac's formula [49, Corollary 2.24] to the random walk on G × G.
D.4 Time spent in different strategies
The probability that i and j employ different strategies at time t, under the neutral DB process with the uniform distribution u over initial placements of the mutant, can be calculated as
The total expected time that i and j spend as different strategies can be calculated as
To connect this result to results described in the main text, we note that one unit of time in the continuous-time DB process corresponds, on expectation, to N time-steps of the discrete-time DB process described in the main text. Thus τ ij is equal to the time that i and j spend as different strategies in the neutral discrete-time DB process. Let τ abs (referred to as T in the main text) denote the expected time until absorption (mutant fixation or extinction) in the neutral discrete-time DB process. Then τ abs − τ ij is the expected time that i and j in the same strategy, from mutant appearance until absorption, in this process.
D.5 Frequency of strategy changes
Here we show that the remeeting time τ + ii is proportional to the expected number of times that vertex i changes strategy. By a simple extension of the duality principle [17, Chapter 5] , if vertex i is replaced at time t, the probability that this results in a strategy change is equal to P RRW i (s 0 ) X(t) = (s 0 ) Y (t) . (Here we refer to the continuous-time RRW, indicated by the absence of a tilde.) In a short time interval [t, t + ), the probability that vertex i is replaced is /N + O( 2 ). Thus, given the uniform distribution u of initial mutant locations, we can calculate Expected # of strategy changes of vertex i during [t, t + )
Now integrating over all times t, we have
E Conditions for success E.1 General case
Combining Eqs. (21) and (27), we obtain that cooperation is favored under weak selection, in the sense ρ C > 1/N to first order in δ, if and only if
This is equivalent to Conditions (1) and (2) of the main text. Using Eqs. (31)-(34), we can rewrite Condition (36) as
If the coefficient of b above is positive, then cooperation is favored above the critical benefit-cost ratio of
E.2 Asymptotic formula
Let us now consider a family of graphs {G N } N for which max i∈G N π i → 0 as N → ∞. Eq. (35) then implies that i∈G N π i τ + ii → ∞ in this limit. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we may suppose that either i∈G N π i τ + ii p
(2) ii either diverges to infinity or remains bounded as N → ∞. In the former case, the 2's in Eq. (38) become negligible and we have
In the latter case, that i∈G N π i τ + ii p 
E.3 Weighted regular graphs
A weighted regular graph has the same distribution of edge weights {w ij } j∈G for each i ∈ G. In this case, p
is the Simpson degree of G [23, 11] . Also, π i = 1/N for each i. Eq. (35) then implies i∈G = N 2 . Substituting in Eq. (38) , we obtain
This result applies not only to weighted regular graphs, but to any graph for which both w i and p
(2)
ii are uniform over all vertices i.
F Starting from a single defector
By reversing the roles of C and D, we can obtain conditions for when defectors are favored to invade a cooperator population. For this section, we relabel the strategies so that 1 corresponds to D and 0 to C. The game matrix can be written as
The overall fixation probability of defectors is defined as ρ D = ρ u under this relabeling.
We observe that the reorderd game matrix (41) satisfies
From Eq. (20) we see that D (s)-the first-order term of the expected instantaneous rate of frequency change-is unaffected by the addition of a constant to the payoff matrix. Thus to determine the first-order behavior of ρ D , it suffices to consider the payoff matrix
This is exactly the payoff matrix (7) with b and c replaced by their opposites. We conclude that the condition for ρ D > 1/N under weak selection is the same as the corresponding condition for ρ C > 1/N with b and c replaced by their opposites. Since Condition (37) is of the form Ac + Bb > 0, we obtain that, to first order in δ, ρ C > 1/N if and only if ρ D < 1/N . Thus Condition (36) implies that ρ C > 1/N > ρ D , and the opposite inequality in Condition (36) implies that ρ C < 1/N < ρ D , under weak selection.
G Arbitrary 2 × 2 games
We now consider arbitrary 2 × 2 matrix games of the form 
G.1 Condition for success
We obtain the general condition for success using the Structure Coefficient Theorem [43] , which states that the condition for A to be favored over B (in the sense ρ A > ρ B under weak selection) takes the form σa + b > c + σd for some structure coefficient σ that is independent of the game. Because of this independence, we can obtain σ from our analysis of the simplified Prisoner's Dilemma (7):
Combining with Condition (36), we obtain
as stated in the main text.
G.2 Positivity of σ
We now prove that both the numerator and the denominator of σ in Eq. (45) are nonnegative for all graphs, and strictly positive for graphs of size N ≥ 3. We begin with a lemma:
Lemma 1. Let G be any connected weighted graph (undirected with no selfloops). For each vertex i of G,
Equality occurs if and only if G a weighted star graph with i as its hub.
Proof. Let vertex i ∈ G be arbitrary and fixed. Our proof uses a variational approach: we hold constant the weights of the edges w ij adjacent to i, but allow the weights of edges not adjacent to i to vary. We will prove this statement in a more general setting where the edges not adjacent to i may be directed-that is, w jk may differ from w kj for j, k = i. We still require that the edges adjacent to i be undirected (w ij = w ji for all j).
In this generalized setting, we denote in-degrees and out-degrees as follows:
The total edge weight of G is again denoted W :
For vertex i we have w in i = w out i = w i . We will prove that the function
has a minimum value of 0. Dividing by w i will then yield the desired result (46) . We first examine the case that w hk = 0 for all h, k = i, meaning that G is a weighted star graph and i its hub. In this case, we have w out j = w ji = w ij for each j = i and w i = W/2, and it is easily verified that F = 0.
We next observe that if h,k =i w hk ≥ w i then w i ≤ W/4. In this case, writing the first and third terms of F as w i (1 − 4w i /W ), we see that F > 0. Therefore, to minimize F , it suffices to restrict the domain of F to the simplex
To show that 0 is the minimum value of F , we look for critical points of F on the interior of ∆, as well as critical points of F restricted to the one of the faces of ∆ where one or more of the w hk are zero. (F cannot be minimized on the remaining face of ∆, where h,k =i w hk = j w ij , because we have already shown that F > 0 in this case.) Such potential minimizing points of F have the property that for each h, k = i with h = k, either w hk = 0 or ∂F ∂w hk = 0. In the latter case, we have
We note in particular that Eq. (50) is independent of k. This implies a stronger characterization of potential minimizing points of F : They must satisfy the property that for all h = i, either Eq. (50) holds or else w hk = 0 for all k = i. Equivalently, for potential minimizing points of F , the vertices other than i can be partitioned into two subsets, labeled V 1 and V 2 , such that w out h = w ih for h ∈ V 1 and w out h = (W/2w i ) w ih for h ∈ V 2 . We now apply Eq. (47):
Rearranging algebraically, we obtain
The first factor on the left-hand side is necessarily positive; therefore all potential minimizing points of F satisfy w i = W/2. This is exactly the case that i is the hub of a weighted star graph, for which we have already shown that F = 0. Thus 0 is the minimum value of F , achieved if and only if G is a weighted star graph with i as its hub.
Positivity of the numerator and the denominator of σ in Eq. (45) for N ≥ 3 follows quickly from the above lemma: Theorem 1. For any connected weighted graph G, the meeting times τ (1) , τ (2) , and τ (3) satisfy
In both cases, equality occurs if and only if G has exactly two vertices.
Proof. For (a) we use Eq. (32)-(34):
Equality occurs if and only if p
(2) ii = 1 for all i, which is only possible when G has two vertices.
For (b), we combine Eq. (34) and (35) with Lemma 1:
Equality arises only if all vertices of G are hubs of a star graph, which occurs if and only if G has two vertices. For the equivalent formulation of (b), we note that Eq. (30) implies that τ (1) = τ (2) + 1.
H Surgery on the star graph
Here we derive the results presented in Figure 3 of the main text.
H.1 Ceiling fan
For the "ceiling fan" graph, in which each of the n leaves is joined by an edge to one other, solving Eqs. (28) and (29) As n → ∞ this quantity converges to 8.
H.2 Joined stars
For two stars (each with n leaves) joined by an edge between their hubs, solving Eqs. (28) and (29) 
I Accumulated payoffs
Accumulated payoffs means that the payoffs to vertex i from its neighbors are multiplied by the corresponding edge weights and summed, without normalization. For the simplified Prisoners' Dilemma (7), the accumulated payoff to vertex i in state s is given by
I.1 Derivation of the critical benefit-cost ratio
To derive (b/c) * for accumulated payoffs, we calculate D (s), the first-order term in the instantaneous rate of change inŝ from state s, by the following modification of the derivation of Eq. (20):
ij π j −cs j + bs
Now combining with Eqs. (19) and (26) 
J Numerical results
Scale-free graphs were generating using the Uncorrelated Configuration Model [42] . Results for accumulated payoffs are shown in Figure J1 . A previous argument [50] based on (inexact) pair approximation found that, with accumulated payoffs, (b/c) * behaves like k nn , the expected degree of the nearest neighbor of a randomly chosen individual. For degree-uncorrelated graphs, k nn = k 2 / k diverges with N for power-law degree distributions with 2 < γ ≤ 3, which suggests that costly cooperation cannot evolve on large scale-free graphs with accumulated payoffs. Our exact method shows that, if (b/c) * does diverge with N , it does so very slowly: for tail exponent γ = 2.1 and N = 500, (b/c) * does not exceed 1.4k for any graphs in our random ensemble. 
K Simulations
We confirmed our mathematical results via simulations on synthetic networks with diverse topologies. Figure K1 presents depictions of ρ C × N as a function of b/c for four network topologies, described below. In all cases, our results predict the crossover points with high accuracy. Graph 1 is a Barabási-Albert network [51], constructed under the preferential attachment mechanism with m = 4, N = 100. Graph 2 is a variant of the preferential attachment model which provides highly-clustered networks with small-world behavior (hereinafter 'KE'), as posited in [52] . The parameters are m = 3, µ = 0.4, N = 100. Graph 3 is a Newman-Watts small world graph [53] with N = 80, constructed by making a 6-regular lattice and then creating each non-existing link with probability 0.1. Graph 4 is constructed via the Forest Fire model [54] (hereinafter 'FF'), which yields networks with small-world properties and tunable community structure, shrinking diameters, as well as heavy-tailed degree distributions. The parameters were set as p = 0.32, p u = 0.28, N = 80.
The simulation setup is as follows. For each graph, we run 500000 Monte Carlo trials. For each trial, all nodes are defectors upon the inception, except one randomly-selected node which is a cooperator. The fixation probability is approximated as the fraction of Monte Carlo trials which eventuate in unanimous cooperation before timestep T , which is set to 400000 (which theoretically should be infinite). The selection strength is set to δ = 10 −2 for averaged payoffs and δ = 10 −3 for accumulated payoffs. The smaller δvalue for accumulated payoffs is needed to compensate for the summing of a potentially large number of individual payoffs.
